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Two debates in contemporary philosophical moral psychology have so far been conducted 
almost entirely in isolation from one another despite their structural similarity. One is the 
debate over the importance for virtue ethics of the results of situational manipulation 
experiments in social psychology. The other is the debate over the ethical implications of 
experiments that reveal gender and race biases in social cognition. In both cases, the ethical 
problem posed cannot be identified without first clarifying the cognitive structures 
underlying the problematic phenomena. In this chapter, I argue that the two kinds of 
phenomena share a basic cognitive structure, which is well articulated by the findings of the 
empirical psychology of attitudes, especially if these findings are understood in the context 
of the cognitive-affective system theory of personality. On the basis of this joint construal 
of situationism and implicit bias, I argue that the negative programme of ethical 
improvement that many philosophers recommend in response to one or other problem is 
unrealistic. Instead, we should consider more seriously the prospects of the positive 
programme of ethical improvement recommended by Aristotle, the direct aim of which is 
to instil deeply in ourselves the values at the heart of each of the virtues. 
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1. Situational Manipulation and Implicit Bias 
The richest and most robust demonstration of situational manipulation in social 
psychology remains Stanley Milgram’s investigation into the ease with which people can be 
persuaded to inflict what appear to be potentially lethal electric shocks on what appears to 
be a fellow volunteer. By varying the experimental setup, Milgram showed that subtle 
situational differences made a significant difference to the degree to which subjects did as 
they are asked (Milgram 1974). Indeed, a recent analysis of Milgram’s personal archive 
makes clear that Milgram employed such situational manipulation to design his experiment 
in the first place. Through a series of pilot studies, he refined the instructions given to the 
subjects, their sensory access to the effects of the shocks on their victim, the design of the 
shock generator itself, and various other details of the experiment, with the express aim of 
finding a surprising headline result. Having found a structure that would produce such a 
surprising result, Milgram published this version of the experiment first, subsequently 
referring to it as the ‘baseline condition’ when publishing results of other versions of the 
experiment (Russell 2011). 
Does it matter, scientifically, that Milgram refined his experiment until it achieved his 
desired results? Does it matter that he designated one version the ‘baseline condition’ 
purely because its results were most likely to attract attention? It depends on the lesson that 
one wants to draw from the data. The results of the ‘baseline condition’ should not be 
taken in isolation. Taken together, the variations of the experiment might provide 
important evidence concerning the details of human motivation. There is certainly one 
general truth that they and the pilot studies clearly reveal: that the subjects’ response to the 
morally most important aspect of the situation, the requests to inflict high levels of electric 
shock on another person, vary significantly with the other aspects of the situation, many of 
which seem to be of no moral importance at all. 
Research into implicit bias probes more deeply into the cognitive architecture that 
generates this situational variation of behaviour. One such experiment found subjects to 
hold much stronger cognitive associations between white people and positive evaluation 
than between black people and positive evaluation. A series of words appeared on a screen 
and subjects were asked to press one of two keys to classify each word into one of two 
–	  3	  /	  21	  –	  
categories. They were asked to make their judgments as quickly as possible, but not so fast 
as to allow mistakes. Some of the words (such as ‘crash’, ‘happy’, ‘peace’, ‘rotten’) were to 
be categorised according to whether they are pleasant or unpleasant. These were mixed 
with names (such as ‘Ebony’, ‘Jed’, ‘Katie’, ‘Lamar’) that were to be categorised as typically 
names of black people or typically names of white people. The subjects themselves were 
white. Their reaction times were much faster when the button for indicating pleasant words 
was also the one used to indicate that a name is typically of a white person than when the 
button for indicating pleasant words was also used to indicate that a name is typically of a 
black person (Greenwald et al 1998: Experiment 3). 
Moreover, a subsequent replication of the experiment found these cognitive associations to 
correlate strongly with biases in the way subjects behaved towards a black experimenter 
and a white experimenter. In particular, the bias in cognitive associations correlated with 
differences in the amount of time the subjects spent talking to each experimenter, the 
proportion of that time the subjects spent actually facing the experimenter, and the 
physical distance they set between themselves and each experimenter. These behavioural 
biases were evident to the experimenters in the discussion as well as to external observers 
(McConnell and Leibold 2001).  
For both kinds of experiment, it has been shown that subjects would explicitly disavow the 
attitudes implied by their behaviour. Of the many subjects who had obeyed his 
experimenter to a high level of electric shock, Milgram found that very few subsequently 
claimed that they had done the right thing in the circumstances (Milgram 1974: ch. 5). 
When the ‘baseline’ version of the experiment was explained to diverse groups of people 
and they were asked to predict how they themselves would behave, most said they would 
stop the experiment when the shock levels were still very low (Milgram 1974: ch. 3). The 
original experiment into cognitive associations of names of black people and white people 
with positive evaluation asked the same subjects explicit questions about their attitudes to 
black people and white people, about the causes of discrimination, and about the value of 
multiculturalism. Many subjects’ responses indicated no racial preference or a mild 
preference in favour of black people even though the implicit association test had indicated 
a preference for white people in those same subjects. The experimenters concluded that 
the results should be taken as ‘indicating the pervasiveness of unconscious forms of 
prejudice’ (Greenwald et al 1998: 1475). 
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2. Evaluative Judgments and the Cognitive-Affective Personality System 
How should we understand the disparity evident in both the Milgram experiment and the 
implicit association experiment between the attitudes indicated by the subjects’ behaviour 
and the attitudes indicated by their explicit judgments? What is the moral problem that this 
disparity poses? One answer to these questions distinguishes between a person’s evaluative 
beliefs and their behavioural dispositions. Evaluative beliefs, on this account, are 
reflectively held and are reported in explicit avowals of belief and in conscious judgments 
about what one should do, but our behaviour is governed by these beliefs only to the 
extent that it results from conscious deliberation. The more intuitive and automatic aspects 
of our behaviour manifest our behavioural dispositions. Given this account of action, the 
moral task presented by the disparity between behaviour and evaluative judgment is the 
task of training one’s behavioural dispositions to bring them into line with one’s evaluative 
beliefs (Besser-Jones 2008). 
An alternative account denies that people have evaluative beliefs that remain consistent 
across contexts. Not only behavioural responses are dependent on seemingly irrelevant 
aspects of the context in which they are made, on this view. The same is true of explicit, 
conscious, deliberative evaluative judgments. The influence these details have over 
judgment, as with their influence over behavioural responses, need not be noticed by the 
subject and might not be endorsed if brought to the subject’s attention. One form of this 
account rests on the idea that mental states each have a degree of accessibility, measured by 
the time it takes to be brought to bear on cognition. The more rapidly one makes a 
judgment, the fewer relevant considerations are going to be taken into account. The more 
slowly and effortfully one deliberates, the more one brings into play relevant beliefs and 
desires that have lower degrees of accessibility. On this view, the moral task is to ensure 
that one makes well considered judgments when it matters, perhaps by adopting the 
strategy of imagining justifying one’s judgment to an audience whose values are unknown 
to oneself (Merritt 2009). 
Both accounts seem consistent with the cognitive-affective system theory of personality, 
which is the dominant theory of the cognition generating behaviour across situations. This 
theory was developed to account for the stability in an individual’s behaviour across 
repetitions of the same situation as well as the variation in that individual’s behaviour 
across situations that differ in subtle details, a stability and variation which together make 
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the individual’s ‘behavioural signature that reflects personality coherence’ (Mischel and 
Shoda 1995: 251). It is not just an individual’s set of mental states themselves that 
determine their behaviour, since ‘it is the organisation of the relationships among them that 
forms the core of the personality structure and that guides and constrains their impact’ 
(Mischel and Shoda 1995: 253). Each mental state is associated with many others and these 
connections vary in strength. They are formed through experience and strengthened 
through use. The cognition that generates behaviour is a flow of activity across this 
network of cognitive and affective states, constrained by the stimuli presented by the 
environment. Because the system develops only slowly, the resulting behaviour is likely to 
be the same on two occasions where the situation is the same. But where a detail of the 
situation is different, this may result in a different flow of activity through the personality 
system and thus a different behavioural outcome.  
This theory was developed to account for behavioural patterns. But if this is the right 
picture of personality generally, rather than simply of behaviour, then we ought to be able 
to understand evaluative judgments in terms of it as well. There seem to be two ways in 
which this personality system might generate evaluative judgments. One corresponds to the 
view that such judgments remain consistent across contexts. If this is right, then the 
judgments in question manifest stable evaluative beliefs, such as the belief that people of 
different ethnicities are equal. Such a belief would be a mental state within the personality 
system. Alternatively, we might understand evaluative judgments to be generated by the 
personality system in much the same way as behaviour. Since the number and strengths of 
a mental state’s associations determine the speed with which it influences cognition, a given 
evaluative judgment will depend on the amount of time devoted to seriously deliberating 
about the issue. 
The cognitive-affective personality system was proposed as a ‘framework within which to 
conceptualise and conduct research to understand the intra-individual dynamics of 
personality and their expression’ (Shoda and Mischel 1996: 415). One way to develop this 
research is to consider which of the two accounts of evaluative judgment is correct. Do 
evaluative judgments express beliefs that are themselves stable units within the personality 
system, or are they situationally variable products of the personality system? We will see 
that this question can be answered by augmenting the personality system theory with the 
findings of attitude psychology. 
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3. Moral Choice Blindness 
Current research into ‘moral choice blindness’ casts doubt on the idea that moral beliefs are 
generally stable. In one experiment, subjects were asked to complete a two-page survey that 
asked how much they agreed with a series of moral statements by giving a score on a 
numerical scale. During the course of the survey, some of the statements they had 
responded to were switched for their negations. After the survey had been completed, 
subjects were asked to work through each statement and justify the response they had 
given. Experimenters were interested in whether subjects would notice that some of the 
statements had been negated, or whether they would offer reasons in favour of the 
opposite view to the one they had originally expressed. If subjects were expressing stable 
moral beliefs, we would expect them not to then justify the opposite of the view they 
expressed. But if they do go ahead and justify the opposing view, then it seems that they 
are not expressing a stable moral belief at all. 
The switch of statements was very well designed. The survey was on two pages of paper 
attached to a clipboard. The statements on the first page were actually printed on a separate 
piece of paper invisibly glued to the page. On the back of the clipboard, in exactly the right 
place, was a patch of stronger glue, so that when the subject turned to the second page the 
statements from the first page stayed on the back of the clipboard, revealing a different set 
of statements underneath. Some of the statements in this set were the same as the ones 
that had been glued over them. Some were the negations of those statements. The 
experimenters recorded the switch as having been detected if the subject spontaneously 
corrected for it by changing their response rather than defending it, or if the subject 
expressed any suspicions about the statements in the post-experimental discussion, or if the 
subject could correctly identify which statements had been reversed once they had been 
told how the experiment worked. Even with this generous range of forms of detection, the 
majority of subjects did not detect any change to the statements (Hall et al 2012).1 
Two conditions are necessary for a subject to fail to detect the change in statement and 
blithely justify the opposite of the view they originally expressed. One is that the subject 
does not remember the original statement. The other is that the subject’s judgments on the 
topic are not consistent across situations. For if the subject did hold a stable view on the 
                                                      
1 A film of the survey being used can be seen at: http://www.lucs.lu.se/cbq/ 
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issue that the statement concerned, then the subject should express that same stable view 
when they first complete the survey and when they are asked to justify the responses on 
the page in front of them. The two situations in which the subject is asked to express a 
view on this topic differ only in one respect. In the second situation only, they are provided 
with false evidence concerning the view they expressed moments earlier. For the majority 
of the subjects, those who did not detect the switch, this difference in situation is enough 
to negate the judgment that they express. In terms of the cognitive-affective personality 
system, the two situations caused different sequences of activity through the network of 
mental states leading to different judgments being expressed. 
What of those who did detect the switch? Perhaps detection was due to the subjects 
holding stable views on the matters that the switched statement concerned. This would 
explain the consistency in judgment across the two situations. In the second situation, the 
subject would recognise that the view expressed on the page is not their own view, so 
would assume that something had gone wrong, perhaps that they had misunderstood the 
question first time around. In terms of the cognitive-affective personality system, there are 
two ways in which such a stability of judgment might occur. One is that the judgement 
simply expresses a particular mental state in the system, a moral belief that remains 
constant irrespective of its position in the network. The other is that the judgments in both 
cases were generated by the personality system as a whole, with the difference between the 
two situations being insufficient to cause a different outcome from this cognition. 
However, stability of judgment across situations is not the only possible explanation of 
detection in this experiment. For it was a short survey and subjects were asked to justify 
their responses as soon as they had finished it. So it remains possible that those who 
detected the switch did so simply because they remembered the original statement. This 
leaves us with two candidate explanations of the experiment overall. One is that some of 
the subjects had stable moral beliefs where others did not. The other is that none of the 
subjects expressed stable moral judgments, but some subjects were better than others at 
remembering the statements. Either way, the experiment presents evidence against the idea 
that moral judgments generally express stable moral beliefs. 
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4. Strength and Influence in Attitude Psychology 
Which of these two explanations of the moral choice blindness experiment is correct? 
Empirical research into the nature and influence of evaluative attitudes suggests that some 
subjects had sufficiently stable attitudes concerning the topic of the switched statements to 
detect the switch, but other subjects did not. An attitude’s stability over time is a matter of 
the ‘strength’ or firmness with which that attitude is held. This is distinct from the 
attitude’s content. For example, you might hold a positive attitude towards democracy as a 
political system. The overall content of this attitude is the degree to which you approve of 
democracy, though the content can also be characterised in more detail to include what you 
think of various aspects of democracy and various different democratic systems. Attitude 
psychologists reserve the term ‘strength’ for a different dimension of the attitude. This is 
the degree to which the attitude is embedded in your cognitive system. An attitude that is 
strong in this sense is not easily changed by persuasion or reconsideration.  
One classic experiment concerning the effects of attitude strength measured the relation 
between subjects’ attitudes towards Greenpeace and their response to an opportunity to 
donate to Greenpeace (Holland et al 2002). At the first stage of the experiment, subjects 
completed a lengthy questionnaire, which included questions about their attitude towards 
Greenpeace. They were asked how much they approved or disapproved of Greenpeace, 
how certain they were of their attitude towards Greenpeace, how important this attitude 
was to them personally, whether this attitude is central to their self-image, and whether this 
attitude reflects values they hold to be important. The first of these questions measured the 
attitude content, the other four measured its strength or firmness. Subjects returned a week 
later for an entirely unrelated experiment. After that experiment was over, they were paid 
for their participation. The payment consisted of a set of coins. They were then offered the 
opportunity to donate some of the money to Greenpeace and were asked to complete a 
short questionnaire about Greenpeace. The first question on the questionnaire asked how 
much of their payment they had donated to Greenpeace, ensuring that subjects made the 
donation before completing the rest of the questionnaire, and the efficacy of this was 
confirmed by observation. One of the later questions asked the subjects to evaluate the 
work of Greenpeace on a scale of 1 to 10. 
Subjects whose attitudes towards Greenpeace were strong, or firmly held, when measured 
at the start of the experiment acted in line with those attitudes when offered the chance to 
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donate to Greenpeace a week later. Those with strong attitudes in favour of Greenpeace 
donated, whereas those with strong attitudes against did not. By contrast, there was no 
significant relation between the attitude reported at the start of the experiment and the 
response to the opportunity to donate to Greenpeace among those subjects whose 
attitudes towards Greenpeace did not score highly on the strength measures at the start of 
the experiment. Moreover, the results of the second attitude measure, taken immediately 
after the opportunity to donate, show that those whose attitudes had scored highly on the 
strength measures a week earlier tended to report the same attitude at this point. Subjects 
who had originally reported weak attitudes, on the other hand, did not tend to report the 
same attitude at this point. Indeed, the attitude they reported at this point reflected whether 
or not they had just donated to Greenpeace, which in turn was unrelated to their original 
attitude report.  
This experiment illustrates a finding that attitude psychology has gradually converged upon, 
that strongly held attitudes consistently manifest in judgments about their objects and in 
behaviour, whereas weakly held attitudes do neither.2 The experimenters explain this in 
terms of the structures of attitudes. A strong attitude, they argue, is a persisting state, but a 
weak attitude is constructed at the time at which it is needed (Holland et al 2002). The 
mental states that a weak attitude is constructed from will vary with the occasion, since 
their relative levels of accessibility vary according to their recent employment in cognition 
and since the amount of time and cognitive resources used to construct the attitude will 
vary. In terms of the cognitive-affective personality system, attitude strength is determined 
by the strengths of the associative connections between the mental states that compose the 
                                                      
2 It is sometimes reported that attitude psychology has found that where explicitly endorsed 
attitudes correlate with behaviour, this is generally due to the attitude having been formed 
to justify prior behaviour rather than the other way around (e.g. Knobe and Leiter 2007: 
102). Although this is true, it ignores experimental investigation into why attitude is shaped 
by behaviour in many cases while in other cases behaviour is shaped by attitude. Danny 
Axsom and Joel Cooper provided striking evidence that the difference lies in attitude 
strength in 1985. (For discussion of this experiment in relation to Aristotle’s theory of trait 
habituation, see Webber 2013: § 4.) The more recent experiment concerning attitudes 
towards Greenpeace confirms this finding and adds that consistency of attitude expression 
in judgment over time is likewise a matter of attitude strength. 
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attitude. When these are sufficiently strong, the set of mental states will continually 
influence cognition together as a whole. But mental states linked by connections that are 
not stronger than most connections in the system will influence the flow of cognition 
individually, each according to its own range and strength of connections. 
5. Attitude Strength and Consistent Judgment 
We can understand the moral choice blindness experiments in terms of this relation 
between attitude strength and consistency of evaluative judgment across situations. If your 
attitude towards democracy, for example, is firmly held, then you are unlikely to be tricked 
into thinking that you have just expressed the negation of that attitude. In a moral choice 
blindness experiment where a switched statement concerned democracy, you would be 
likely to detect the switch. If the statement concerned some topic on which you do not 
hold a strong attitude, however, you would construct your response at the time on the basis 
of the available relevant beliefs and desires. When presented with your purported response 
to such a statement and asked to justify the response, if you did not remember that this was 
not in fact your response, then you will again construct and explain an attitude, but this 
time one of the most salient mental states drawn on in constructing the attitude would be 
the false belief about your response to the statement moments earlier. So the mental states 
drawn upon in the attitude construction will feature those most closely and strongly 
associated with the content of that purported response. These will be the reasons you then 
give. 
A detail of the experiment supports this interpretation. The survey asked subjects whether 
they held strong moral opinions in general and whether they were politically active. 
Responses to the first of these did not correlate with whether the subject detected the 
statement negation. This is consonant with the explanation in terms of attitude strength, 
for one’s answer to this general question seems unlikely to correlate with strength of 
attitude on the specific topics that the negated statements concerned. There was, however, 
some correlation between detection of statement negation and the second question. More 
specifically, this correlation held for one group of subjects but not the other. For there 
were two versions of the survey. One presented highly general moral statements, such as 
‘even if an action might harm the innocent, it can still be morally permissible to perform it’. 
The other presented more specific statements, such as ‘the violence Israel used in the 
conflict with Hamas is morally defensible despite the civilian casualties suffered by the 
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Palestinians’. Subjects who considered themselves politically active and who were given the 
more specific moral questions were significantly more likely than any other subjects to 
detect the statement negation. This is unsurprising. Politically active people are more likely 
to hold strong attitudes on the moral aspects of specific political issues, but it does not 
follow that they are likely to hold strong general moral attitudes. Indeed, such a person 
might express agreement with a general moral statement on the basis of strong attitudes 
concerning specific applications of it, but when presented with evidence that they disagree 
with the general statement might justify this in terms of strong attitudes concerning other 
specific applications. 
We can understand the Milgram experiment and the implicit bias experiment in the same 
way. Before one has encountered the Milgram experiment, one is extremely unlikely to 
have a strong attitude concerning how one ought to behave in precisely that situation. 
When asked to predict how one would behave in the experiment, therefore, one constructs 
an attitude from relevant mental states. When actually in the experiment, one also judges 
and acts on the basis of attitudes constructed at the time. Many subjects in the experiment 
do construct the attitude that people predict they would construct. This is manifested when 
the subjects argue with the experimenter, seek confirmation that their actions are causing 
no harm, and even briefly refuse to continue. But each prompt from the experimenter 
requires the subjects to construct their attitudes anew. As it does so, each prompt also 
changes the relative levels of accessibility of the mental states drawn on to construct the 
attitude. For this reason, a subject is likely to vacillate between judging that the experiment 
should stop and judging that it can continue. Neither judgment, moreover, is wholehearted. 
Each attitude constructed incorporates considerations in favour of continuing and 
considerations against. 
Do the explicit measures that are compared with the results of the implicit association test 
record persistent strong attitudes or weak attitudes? Although the original experiment 
found that the implicit test results were often contradicted by the same subject’s explicitly 
reported attitudes, a subsequent replication with a minor alteration eliminated this 
divergence. In the original experiment, the explicit questions followed the implicit test 
(Greenwald et al 1998). In the replication, this order was reversed (McConnell and Leibold 
2001). This suggests that the explicit measures generally recorded weak attitudes that were 
dependent on the situation. Since the reaction time differences measured by the implicit 
association test are imperceptible to the subject, the test often leaves the subject with the 
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false impression that they have treated black and white faces equally in what is clearly a 
scientific measure of their attitudes. Since weak attitudes tend to confirm recent behaviour, 
as we saw in the Greenpeace experiment, these subjects are likely to report attitudes 
consonant with their false belief that they have just treated these two ethnic groups equally. 
When the question is asked before the implicit association test is taken, on the other hand, 
the weak attitude constructed is likely to manifest the same associations and accessibility 
levels as are then manifested in the test itself.3 
If this is right, then neither of the two construals of situationist and implicit bias 
experiments that we began with is correct. One of these construals held that our 
behavioural dispositions are not always in line with our evaluative beliefs, which assumed 
our explicit moral judgments to be consistent across situations. The other construal denied 
this assumption, portraying moral judgments as varying with some details of the situation. 
What the attitude strength and moral choice blindness experiments suggest, however, is 
that those of our explicit moral judgments that express firmly held attitudes are thereby 
consistent across situations, whereas others are constructed when needed from resources 
that vary across situations. Moreover, the strong attitudes that manifest in consistent 
judgments also manifest in consistent behaviour. So the moral task these experiments pose 
is neither one of bringing behavioural dispositions into line with evaluative beliefs nor one 
of undertaking strategies to ensure careful deliberation in morally important situations. It is 
to ensure that one holds the right moral attitudes sufficiently strongly that one’s judgments 
and actions will express them consistently.4 
 
                                                      
3 The authors of the replication study hypothesise that having taken the implicit association 
test might increase the role of self-presentation effects in answering the explicit questions 
(McConnell and Leibold 2001: 440-1). Since the explicit measure was thoroughly 
anonymised, the authors must have in mind the presentation of one’s self to oneself. But 
they do not explain why the explicit measures themselves would not have this effect to a 
sufficient degree to shape one’s responses to them even without having taken the implicit 
association test. 
4 This is the idea of virtue ethics and situational variation ascribed to Plato, Aristotle, and 
the Stoics by Rachana Kamtekar (2004: 277-286). 
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6. The Negative Programme of Moral Improvement 
How should one aim to ensure that one’s moral attitudes are not only correct but also 
sufficiently firmly held to manifest in consistent judgment and behaviour? What practical 
ethical guidance is the best response to the cognitive structures that explain situational 
manipulation and implicit bias? One kind of response would be to prescribe a negative 
programme of moral improvement. The aim would be to identify the features of situations 
that lead one to judge and act in morally problematic ways, then undertake strategies to 
prevent these features from having this malign influence. This is a negative programme 
because it aims to negate the morally negative influence of particular aspects of situations. 
Such recommendations are not uncommon as responses to both situationist experimental 
results and the implicit bias experiments. 
One form of this response recommends that we simply avoid situations that might lead us 
to behave badly (Doris 2002: 147-8). This might be sage advice for some kinds of situation, 
but the scope for this kind of control is clearly very limited. A more promising form of this 
response is the converse recommendation to preserve and promote the features of 
situations that support morally desirable behaviour (Kamtekar 2004: 490-1). For example, 
if one’s behaviour towards a particular ethnic group is biased by strong negative 
associations in one’s cognitive system, then one can alter one’s environment in ways that 
are likely to weaken these associations or strengthen more positive ones to counteract 
them. The efficacy of such a strategy is strikingly illustrated by ‘the Obama effect’: implicit 
measures of white people’s cognition in response to images of black people found a 
significant decrease in evidence of negative associations as a result of the widespread media 
coverage of Barack Obama’s first presidential campaign (Plant et al 2009). 
Other forms of the negative programme dispense with the idea of managing one’s situation 
and instead focus on shaping one’s cognitive system more directly. One such strategy is to 
aim to alter one’s pattern of cognitive associations with some particular situational feature 
through regularly forming the desired associations in action or in conscious imagination 
(Mischel and Shoda 1995: 261; Snow 2006: 556, 560). Alternatively, one can formulate and 
rehearse intentions to behave in a particular way in response to particular situations 
(Mischel and Shoda 1995: 261; Kamtekar 2004: 487-8; Besser-Jones 2008: 328-9). In terms 
of the cognitive-affective personality system, these strategies aim to forge and strengthen 
particular pathways through the architecture that generates judgments and behaviour, so 
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that when the relevant situations arise one’s cognitive system tends towards producing the 
outcomes that one has trained it to produce. 
However, this negative programme might seem inordinately demanding. A very wide 
variety of subtle situational cues can influence our judgments and actions. Although the 
experimental literature on implicit bias tends to focus on responses to women and to black 
men there is no reason to assume that such biases are limited to these categories. The 
negative programme of moral improvement should include all the biases relating to the full 
range of ethnic and religious identities we encounter. Moreover, there is evidence of 
widespread biases concerning an individual’s height and weight (e.g. Marini et al 2013). It 
seems plausible that there are further biases concerning aspects of social background 
indicated by a speaker’s accent. Once all of these are taken into account, the negative 
programme seems rather daunting. But it may be even more so, since there remains the 
question of how these biases interact. Must a white person’s bias concerning Oriental 
women, for example, simply be a function of distinct biases concerning Oriental people 
and concerning women? Or is it a specific bias that would require its own strategy for 
overcoming? The same question arises about the interplay of these biases and the classic 
situational manipulations. Do ethnicity and gender feature in our perceptions of authority 
figures or passive bystanders in the same way that they feature in our perceptions of 
students in a seminar room? 
Even if these issues were to be resolved satisfactorily, so that a full set of strategies could 
be formulated for counteracting one’s most morally problematic implicit biases and 
situational weaknesses, and even if it were accepted that this set of strategies was not overly 
demanding, then there would still remain the further question of how one can ensure that 
this programme of strategies will actually be carried through. This is most obvious in the 
case of the strategy of avoiding certain situations. The problem here is not that one might 
find oneself in such a situation for reasons beyond one’s control. It is rather that when one 
is making a decision that determines whether one enters that situation, one might at that 
point be subject to situational influences or implicit biases. On a larger scale, a full 
programme of strategies for counteracting unwanted influences is itself an intended 
sustained pattern of behaviour that seems vulnerable to the kinds of influence it is intended 
to counter. The negative programme, that is to say, seems to preserve a vestige of the idea 
that our behaviour manifests our reflectively endorsed beliefs. We need to take more 
seriously the finding that simply deciding to adopt a certain mode of behaviour, or to 
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pursue a range of strategies, is not enough to ensure that we actually do so. Our strategies 
can be derailed by the influence on our cognition of the subtle features of our situations, of 
our biases concerning the people we deal with, and of the demands of our everyday lives. 
7. The Positive Programme of Moral Improvement 
How can we deal with the problems of situational manipulation and implicit bias without 
our strategies for doing so being undermined by the same aspects of cognition that 
produce these problems? The findings of attitude psychology afford an answer to this 
question. To pursue some behavioural strategy, it is important that one habituate in oneself 
a sufficiently strong attitude in favour of that strategy. One’s judgments about whether to 
expend effort in pursuit of this strategy will remain consistent across situations only if they 
manifest a firmly held attitude. If they are merely constructed out of the most accessible 
relevant beliefs and desires each time, they will vary with the relative accessibility of one’s 
mental states, which in turn will vary with the situation one is in, the situations one has 
recently experienced, and one’s recent cognitive activity. Indeed, these factors will 
determine whether one even consciously thinks of the strategy on a given occasion when it 
could be pursued. 
Once we see this problem in terms of attitude strength, however, it becomes clear that the 
negative programme is not the only way to address the practical problems of situational 
manipulation and implicit bias. For the influence that a strong attitude has on cognition 
and behaviour is not restricted to situations in which some feature of the environment is 
directly related to the attitude. Attitude strength determines the attitude’s general degree of 
accessibility to cognition. The stronger it is, the more accessible it is, the greater its 
influence over cognition generally. For this reason, a strong attitude can shape cognition 
and behaviour in ways that are not responses to the manifest features of the situation 
(Webber 2013: § 4). In order to reduce one’s susceptibility to situational manipulations and 
implicit biases, therefore, one can aim to instil in oneself a few firmly held moral attitudes, 
such as attitudes in favour of fairness or against discrimination. With a sufficiently high 
degree of accessibility, these general attitudes should serve to counteract the influence of 
situational manipulations and implicit biases. Unlike the negative programme of moral 
improvement, the aim of this programme would be to identify and embed in one’s 
cognition the attitudes that tend one towards the right behaviour. This is a positive 
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programme of moral improvement, which relies on the holistic nature of the cognitive-
affective personality system. 
This proposed programme of moral improvement echoes Aristotle’s account of 
habituation. Character traits develop, according to Aristotle, through critically reflective 
practice. This habituation serves two ethical purposes. One is that it embeds one’s values 
into one’s behavioural cognition sufficiently firmly that one will judge and act in ways that 
manifest those values even in the face of temptations to do otherwise (NE: 1152a25-33). 
The other is that it refines one’s understanding of the nature and demands of those 
evaluative commitments. One learns what justice really is and what it requires through 
repeatedly thinking about what justice requires in particular situations (NE: 1104a5-10). In 
terms of attitude psychology, the first of these purposes is served by strengthening the 
attitude and the second by refining the set of mental states that compose that attitude. In 
the context of the cognitive-affective personality system, these are processes of 
strengthening the associative connections between the relevant mental states, connections 
that strengthen each time they are used. The positive programme of moral improvement, 
therefore, would carry out the Aristotelian recommendation of habituating the ethical 
virtues.5 
Because this programme would be focused on instilling a few basic traits, it would not face 
the problems that affect the negative programme. The task of instilling such basic values as 
justice, considerateness, and generosity does require ongoing critical reflection on one’s 
own behaviour in relation to the demands of these values, but this is significantly less 
demanding than the reflection required to identify all of one’s significant situational 
weaknesses and cognitive biases. In the positive programme, moreover, that reflection 
itself is the central technique for instilling virtue, though it may be supplemented by other 
techniques, whereas in the negative programme the reflection is merely an inquiry that 
informs one’s strategies for self-improvement. This less demanding nature of the positive 
programme means that it is less susceptible to being derailed by situational pressures, 
                                                      
5 Peggy DesAutels (2012) also suggests a positive programme of counteracting implicit 
biases. Her suggestion is grounded in a different area of cognitive science. Whether her 
account of the generation of implicit bias is compatible with the one detailed in this paper 
is too complicated a matter to be properly addressed here. 
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cognitive biases, and everyday life. For these have their greatest influence on the rapid 
cognition underlying everyday decision-making. The slower, more careful, and only 
occasional deliberative reflection required by the positive programme is not generally 
susceptible to them. Moreover, as the programme progresses one’s tendency towards 
critical reflection in the light of the values one is trying to instil will itself be strengthened. 
At present, there is no direct empirical confirmation of this theoretical prediction that one 
can reduce susceptibility to situational manipulation and implicit bias by habituating the 
requisite attitudes. Research into situational effects has developed independently of attitude 
psychology. Research into prejudice and stereotyping began in the context of attitude 
psychology, but soon developed independently of the main path of development of 
attitude psychology.6 However, there are experimental findings that support confidence 
that such empirical confirmation could be found. Research into the efficacy of goals is 
particularly suggestive in this regard, because goals share with attitudes the feature of 
having a dimension of strength or firmness as well as a dimension of content. 
In one such experiment, subjects were shown a series of words, each preceded by a picture 
of a woman or a man, and asked to pronounce the word. If a picture of a woman had 
activated concepts stereotypically associated with women, then the subject should be able 
to pronounce any stereotypical words more quickly. Subjects had been tested for whether 
they strongly held the goal of treating women equally with men. The experiment found that 
a strong goal of egalitarianism towards women prevented the activation of stereotypical 
associations in response to pictures of women. Moreover, the speed at which the subjects 
responded indicates that the egalitarian goal had this effect without the subject’s conscious 
intent (Moskowitz et al 1999). 
This goal of egalitarianism towards women is more general than the goal of treating 
women equally with men if they are of a particular ethnicity, or a particular range of body 
shapes, or in particular social roles or situations, but less general than the positive 
programme recommends. Perhaps at least some of the subjects held this goal because they 
were committed generally to egalitarianism, but the experiment did not test for this. A 
more recent experiment tested the effect on stereotyping of a broader egalitarian goal, 
                                                      
6 For the history of this divergence and a detailed argument in favour of an reintegrating 
attitude psychology and the psychology of prejudice and stereotyping, see Maio et al 2010. 
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defined as ‘treating people equally regardless of their ethnicity, gender, race, physical 
appearance’. This experiment did not measure how firmly each subject was already 
committed to this value, but manipulated the subjects so that this value became temporarily 
highly accessible for some, much less accessible for others. It found that subjects for whom 
this general egalitarianism was highly accessible did not make stereotypical associations in 
response to images of black people, whereas those subjects for whom this value was not 
highly accessible did. Again, the speed of the experiment makes it impossible for this 
stereotype inhibition to be the result of conscious thought (Moskowitz and Li 2011). 
Precisely how the idea of a goal employed in these experiments is related to the conception 
of an attitude emerging from attitude psychology is a matter that cannot be properly 
addressed here. Nevertheless, these results do suggest that direct empirical support could 
be found for the theoretical prediction that strengthening the right attitudes reduces the 
automatic activation of problematic associations. The design and analysis of such 
experiments would need to be grounded in an integrative conceptual approach to the 
findings of these divergent research areas. Debates over the ethical implications of 
situational manipulation and of implicit bias, and indeed over the prospects for virtue 
ethics more generally, would benefit greatly if such experiments concerning the positive 
programme of character development were to be undertaken.7 
 
  
                                                      
7 This paper was developed through presentations at the ‘Ethics and the Architecture of 
Personal Dispositions’ conference at the Sorbonne in July 2012, a workshop of the 
Leverhulme ‘Implicit Bias and Philosophy’ project at University of Sheffield in July 2012, 
the Bristol-Cardiff Ethics Symposium in November 2013, and a conference of the Jubilee 
Centre for Character and Values in January 2014. I am grateful to the organisers and 
participants of those conferences for discussion. I am also grateful to Mark Alfano, Alberto 
Masala, and Clea Rees for comments on an earlier draft. 
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